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ABSTRACT
This report discusses the legal restraints on the
use of electronic communications systems for dissemina-
tion of instructional materials in the United States.
First the report examines the laws relating to public
school elementary and secondary education, with primary
emphasis on selection of courses of study and instruc-
tional materials. The second half contains an examina-
tion of the copyright laws, both the copyright law now
in effect and the revision thereto currently pending
before the Congress of the United States.
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I. Introduction
The law can be described as a system of principles or rules of
conduct so established as to Justify a prediction with reasonable
certainty that they will be enforced by the courts if their authority
is challenged. Thus, it is a collection of precepts that define
and control the rights of each individual or institution and the
obligations owed by that individual to others and to society as a
whole. Behind each rule of law lies the sanction of the systematic
application of the force of politically organized society, waiting
to be utilized upon appropriate request.
The restraints of the law can affect behavior in several
ways. First of all, they can prohibit certain modes of behavior
altogether, either because of supposed anti-social consequences or
because such behavior causes an impermissible infringement upon the
legally-recognized rights of others. Second, the law can limit
the amount of the behavior that can be engaged in, either by pro-
hibiting it altogether to certain selected entities or by limiting
the total amount of the activity that can be engaged in collectively.
Such limitations can be enforced by sanctioning the activity only to
those willing to bear a nonmoney burden, such as standing in line or
applying for a license, or by sanctioning the activity only to those
willing to pay a monetary burden imposed on the activity. Finally,
the law can modify behavior by sanctioning it in certain forms and
prohibiting it in all others.
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The law restrains the dissemination of instructional
materials by educational communications systems primarily by recognizing
certain "rights" in third parties and requiring the disseminators to
obtain the consent of the owners of those "rights" as a condition
precedent to legally permissible dissemination. To the extent that
the necessary consent can be obtained only upon the assumption of
a monetary burden, it increases the cost of the system. Where the
consent is contingent upon specific forms of operation, it limits
the freedom of action of the disseminator. Moreover, the sheer
necessity of obtaining consent imposes certain transactions
costs upon the disseminator, which can hamper to some extent his
structure or operation. Finally, where the consent cannot be
obtained in any way open to the disseminator, the law fore-
closes him altogether from certain avenues of conduct.
This paper will examine two legal restraints deemed to
be of greatest significance to instructional material dissemination.
The first is the public school system, which develops and enhances
the requirements for public elementary and secondary education.
The second is the copyright system, which recognizes certain
rights in the creators of original intellectual works. In the
judgment of the author, the restraints imposed by these two
systems of law are of primary concern for the dissemination in
question.
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II. The Public School System
Any meaningful effort to utilize education communications
systems for elementary and secondary education must necessarily
involve the public schools. According to Denzau, non-public
schools in 1970 enrolled only 5.6 million elementary and
secondary students, slightly more than 10 percent of the
total enrollment. Moreover, most of those students were enrolled
1
at the elementary level. Perhaps even more important is the
fact that of the more than $37,000,000 expended on elementary and
secondary education in 1967-68, about $33,000,000 was expended for
2
publicly controlled instruction. Thus, public education is by
far the larger and more lucrative market to aim for.
In the United States, in contrast to most other nations,
public education is controlled and regulated by the states, and
not by the national government.
The United States national government does not directly control
public education because it is a government of limited powers, with
only the authority specifically delegated in the Constitution. Edu-
cation is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution as a
function of the national government. However, the Constitution
does confer on Congress the power "to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imports and Excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common
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defense and general Welfare of the United States." The Supreme
Court has interpreted this provision as implied authority for
Congress to expend tax monies for any purpose directly related to
4
"the general Welfare." Public education is undoubtedly such a purpose.
On the basis of this implied authorization, the national
government has exercised considerable influence in the development
of the American public school system. Even before the Consti-
tution was adopted, Congress enacted the Ordinances of 1785 and
1787, providing for land grants to the states from the public
domain for the "maintenance of public schools," pursuant to a
policy declaration that "religion, morality and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools
and the means of education shall be forever encouraged." Some
of the more important subsequent federal programs have been
the 1917 Vocational Education Act, the 1946 National School
Lunch Act and the 1958 National Defense Education Act. By setting
forth specific criteria for federal fund eligibility, the national
government has used these programs to exert a considerable influence
over the policies adopted by the states in their public schools.
The power over education is considered to be an essential attri-
bute of each state's sovereignty, as broad as its power to tax,
establish and maintain a system of courts, and exercise the police
power. The state's authority over education is not a distributive
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one to be exercised by local government, but a central power residing
in the legislature of the state. The legislature has the unrestricted
right to prescribe the methods of education, limited only by express
constitutional provisions.
State legislatures can administer their programs themselves,
or they may delegate the administration to others. In the field of
education, most legislatures have chosen the latter course. Although
the patterns vary widely in detail, most states have a state board of
education, which acts as the policy making body, and a state department
of education, which acts as the main administrative and super-
visory body. The department of education can act as regulator,
advisor, coordinator and/or researcher for the public school system.
Finally, each state has local school boards, which are the
administrative agencies assigned the task of actually running the
schools. These boards are agencies of the state and not of any local
governmental entities. They are quasi-municipal corporations,
possessing only those powers expressly granted them by state constitu-
tion and statutes, and those powers which are necessarily implied from
the express powers. Scne of these powers are discretionary, requiring
subjective judgment that can only be exercised by the board as a board.
Other are ministerial, requiring no judgment and can be delegated
to individual board members or subordinate employees. The creation,
alteration and abolition of public school districts is, in the
main, controlled by the legislature and protected by the courts.
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The operators of an educational communications system
should pay primary attention to two legal parameters of
public school systems. The first is the specific statutory
provisions relating to the question of what can or must be
taught in the public schools. The second is the limitations
on the materials that can be used to teach those or any other
public school subjects.
So far as prescribing courses of study is concerned,
it is firmly established in this country that the power of
course selection to be pursued in the public schools rests
with the legislature, and its mandate is final and binding.
The legislature is deemed to possess the power to require
that studies essential to good citizenship be taught and
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the
public welfare. The courts have consistently held that the
legislative mandates must be followed regardless of parental
wishes. The only possible grounds for attack available to
dissatisfied parents are that a particular legislative direction
violates the individual liberties protected by the United
States Constitution and its amendments or violates provisions
or restrictions which may be found in a particular state
constitution.
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A few states have specific constitutional provisions
concerning what must be taught. The most common of these
are provisions specifically barring sectarian education in
the public schools. However, constitutional provisions can
and do go much further than this--Utah, for example, has a
constitutional requirement that the metric system be taught.
Most of the state curricular prescriptions are found
in statutes. Teaching the constitution of the United States
is required by statute in almost all states. Provisions
requiring the teaching of the appropriate state constitution
are almost as common. Many states also require the teaching
of national and state history in elementary or secondary
schools. Other common curricular mandates include instruction
in such areas as arithmetic, spelling, effects of alcohol and
narcotics, conservation, health, safety and physical training.
Many states have statutes which go beyond the establish-
ment of certain fields of knowledge that must be taught and
also contain provisions relating to ideas and attitudes.
The most common are statutes requiring the teaching of
"patriotism" and "good citizenship." Nebraska goes further
and requires teaching of "the benefits and advantages of our
form of government and the dangers and fallacies of Nazism,
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Communism and similar ideologies." Florida probably goes the
farthest of all in requiring teachers to inculcate "principles
of truth, honesty and patriotism" as well as "the practice of
7
every Christian virtue."
On the negative side, a state has the power to prohibit
any teachings which can be shown to be inimical to the health,
safety or morals of the people of the state. However, the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the right
to teach educationally valid material (such as a foreign
language) is a constitutionally-protected right of teachers,
as is the right of pupils to acquire such knowledge and the
right of parents to control the education of their young.
These rights can be interfered with by the legislature only
upon a showing that the acquistion by a child of such
knowledge is clearly "injurious to the health, morals, or
8
understanding of the ordinary child."
III. Control of Textbooks and Other Educational Materials
Textbook selection authority also reflects the general
pattern of ultimate control at the state level. Whether there
is an express constitutional provision or not, the courts
agree that the right to select public school textbooks is vested
primarily in the legislature, and the legislature's power is
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full and complete. Pursuant to that power, the legislatures
may constitutionally prohibit the purchase of textbooks not
on specified lists, grant a publisher the right to supply the
needs of a school for a stated period, limit the prices to be
paid for textbooks or require publishers to establish a central
depository in the state at the publishers' expense for dis-
tribution of books. The legislatures may also delegate the
power of textbook selection to a state board or commission or
to local authorities of the school district or municipality.
In the absence of proof of malevolent intent, the courts will
not interfere with the exercise of these powers by the appro-
priate authority. The legislatures have discretion to
authorize the furnishing of textbooks to pupils free of charge
or to require payment for same from those pupils whose families
can afford to pay. However, a state may not make the purchase
or rental of a textbook a condition precedent for admission
to the schools.
The states are approximately evenly divided on the manner
in which the power of textbook selection is actually exercised.
In about half of the states, textbook selection power is
held by either the state board of education or a special
state textbook commission made up of persons connected
professionally with public education. In the other states,
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the textbook selection authority is placed by statute
directly in the hands of the local school boards. A few
states, e.g. Colorado and Utah, go so far as to have
constitutional prohibitions against textbook selection by
9
the legislature or state board of education.
The above description probably overstates the actual
extent of state control over educational material selection,
for several reasons. In the first place, the state boards
will almost never prescribe a single textbook that must be
used in all classes on a particular subject throughout the
state; instead, the state customarily establishes a multiple
list of books from which each local board can make its selection.
Second, the state boards will select textbooks only for the
courses that must be offered in all public schools throughout
the state. Local school boards select the textbooks for the
courses they decide locally to offer. Finally, the state will
select only the "textbooks" for the particular designated
courses; local boards have the power to supplement those textbooks
with other books or materials of their own choice. So long
as a state-approved book is adopted and used as the main
work in the course, supplementary additions by local boards
are permissible.
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These legal parameters present the operators of an
educational communications system with crucial policy de-
cisions. The operator can minimize his legal risks by con-
fining his activities to the provision of supplementary
materials for use in courses other than the basic "reading,
writing, arithmetic, government and health" courses. Such
a system would carry materials that local boards are free to
acquire without the necessity for obtaining prior state
approval. On the other hand, this strategy would limit the
operator's market, because by definition he would be providing
material for courses that some local boards will offer and
others will not. More seriously, the financial resources
available to the typical board to obtain supplementary materials
is usually quite limited and subject to competing demands for
smaller classes, newer equipment, and the like. Such money
is in short supply and highly coveted. Whether enough could
be allocated to support a large-scale communications satellite-
based system so as to make such a system economically viable is
very questionable, given the current scarcity of resources.
On the other hand, the operator could decide to provide
a basic "electronic textbook" for a course that is required
almost everywhere, such as "Understanding the National Con-
stitution." This would afford him the maximum possible
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market, because the course is taught almost everywhere and
basic textbooks have a high priority in the budget allocation
process. However, such an offering would have to be approved
by 25 state boards before it could be used in those respective
states. Gaining such approval could require a long and bitter
political struggle, especially if an influential group such
as the teachers viewed the system as a potential threat to
job security. The bitter feelings that might be aroused could
make it difficult to get the operator's materials actually
adopted, even after a successful fight to have them placed
on the state's approved list.
Probably the most attractive strategy would be one
10
similar to the policy advocated by Barnett and Denzau. An
initial introductory period would be contemplated, during
which the system would be used only for peripheral class-
room tasks and the effort would be concentrated on gaining
teacher approval of the systems. Operation during this
period might not be compensatory. After this approval was
obtained, an effort could be made to expand the system into
a major classroom tool. State approval could be deferred until
this later date, when it could be obtained more easily and
without a residue of bad feelings. Ideally, federal
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government support could be obtained for the first phase,
in much the same way as the "performance contract" test was
funded by OEO.
IV. Copyright
Copyright has been defined as "the exclusive right
secured by law to an author or his assigns to multiply and
dispose of copies of an intellectual or artistic creation
11
whether by mechanical reproduction or public presentation."
Its doctrinal origins can be traced back to the Boman Empire,
when important manuscript publishers paid authors for the
right to duplicate or sell their works. Trade usage led
others to honor a publisher's exclusive rights in a work
transferred to him.
In Anglo-American law, copyright protection is traced
to the chartering of the Stationer's Company in 1556 as a
part of the efforts of the Crown to suppress the religious
ideas of the Protestant Reformation. The members of the
company were granted by Royal Patent the exclusive right to
print books in the British Isles. In return, the stationers
agreed to print only books approved by the Crown and to
search out and destroy all illicit presses and unlawful
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books. The scope of this first copyright was the right to
publish and no more--literally a right to copy. It was a
right to which a given work was subject and not the owner-
ship of the work itself.
This system ended with the collapse of censorship at
the end of the Seventeenth Century. In order to protect
the publishing industry from the possible chaos of un-
restricted competition, the stationers persuaded Parliament
to pass the Statute of Anne which provided for two different
kinds of copyrights: The stationers' copyright existing in all
books already published was extended for twenty-one years; in
addition, a new statutory copyright was set up for all books
subsequently published. This copyright was limited to a term
of fourteen years, with a similar renewal term only in the
author. The right granted was "the sole liberty of printing
and reprinting" a book, which was infringed by anyone who
should "print, reprint or import" the book without consent.
Offenders were to forfeit their books and also to forfeit a
penny a sheet, one moiety to the Queen and the other to the
person suing for same. To prevent punishing inadvertent
offenders, the statute provided that forfeiture and penalty
could not be exacted with respect to new books unless the
title to the copy was entered, before publication, in the
register book at the Hall of the Stationer's Company.
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Because the Statute of Anne vested the power to obtain
new copyrights and copyright renewals in authors rather than
publishers, copyright came to be looked upon as a property
right of the owner. By a process of Judicial expansion,
copyright came to be the author's sole property right, em-
bracing his entire interest in a published work. It protected
the author's right not only to publish a work, but to alter
it, change it any way he chooses, prepare derivative works,
and to prevent others from doing likewise.
The colonists brought the English law of copyright to
this country as a part of their common law heritage. By the
time of the Constitutional Convention, all but one of the
original states had passed copyright laws. However, at the
Convention, the drafters felt that copyright and patent could
not be satisfactorily protected on a state-by-state basis.
Therefore, they inserted into the Constitution Article 1,
section 8, clause 8, which provides:
"The Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Acts; by securing for
limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
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The first national copyright act was passed by Congress
and approved by President Washington on May 31, 1790. The
act covered only books, maps and charts and resembled the
Statute of Anne in all but formal details. American copy-
right law was revised periodically throughout the nineteenth
century. Generally, these modifications involved expanding
the rights of the copyright owner, both in terms of expanding
the categories of works entitled to copyright protection and
in expanding the substantive rights granted exclusively to the
copyright owner.
The currently effective copyright law is the Copyright
12
Act of 1909. The Act followed a request to Congress by
President Taft in December, 1905 for a complete revision of
the copyright laws, which were then scattered in 12 different
statutes. In response to that message, various conferences
involving all interested persons were held in 1905 and 1906.
Legislation was introduced in 1906 and 1907 but no action was
taken. Finally, in 1908 legislation satisfactory to all
interested parties was drafted and enacted on March 4, 1909.
The Act first describes the subject matter of copyright
as "all the writings of an author" and lists thirteen categories
of works which are generally considered to encompass the
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entire scope of "all writings"--books, periodicals, lectures,
dramatic and musical compositions, maps, works of art, re-
production of works of art, scientific drawings, photographs
and motion pictures. The author of a copyrightable work
upon compliance with certain statutory requirements is given
a list of specified exclusive rights--the right to publish,
translate, make other versions, dramatize, arrange, complete,
deliver in public, perform and record. These rights are
granted for an initial term of 28 years, with a right to
renew for an additional 28 year term.
The use of copyrighted works in an educational class-
room is not in itself a violation of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner. However, if a teacher attempts to
reproduce all or part of a copyrighted work without the
prior consent of the copyright owner, she may thereby
violate the owner's exclusive right to "copy" the work.
There is under present law a Judicially created
exception to the owner's exclusive right to copy, known as
the doctrine of "fair use." This doctrine acknowledges a
limited right of others to copy portions of copyrighted
works under appropriate circumstances. Neither the limits
of the doctrine nor its logical Justification is very clear.
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Courts have tried to set out a series of criteria that pre-
sumably must be examined to determine if a particular instance
of copying is a "fair use." For example, in Carr v. National
Capital Press, 71 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934), the court
stated it needed to examine the following factors:
"The value of the part appropriated; its relative value
to each of the works in controversy; the purposes it
serves in each; how far the copied matter will tend to
supersede the original or interfere with its sale;
and other considerations."
The clearest example of a "fair use" is the reproduction
of portions of a copyrighted book in a review of that book.
Technically, this is an infringement of the author's exclusive
right to copy all or a portion of his work. On the other
hand, the copying involved is something that would not be
objectionable to a reasonable copyright owner. The
appropriation does not appear to do any damage to the commercial
value of his rights. In fact, such reviews probably enhance
its commercial value.
Similarly it has always been accepted that the copying
of a work by an educator for use in connection with his
research or educational duties was a permissible "fair use."
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The copiers were not attempting to derive personal commercial
benefit from the labor of another. Moreover, the advance-
ment of scholarly research and education is a goal highly
favored in this society. Finally, it was felt that such
appropriation would have no appreciable adverse effect on
the market for the copyrighted work itself or any of the
protected rights of the copyright owner.
However, with the advent of cheap and efficient photo-
copying machines, this practice has come under new criticism
from copyright holders, commonly the book publishers. The
market for many textbooks and other instructional materials
is now primarily confined to the sale of multiple copies to
schools and school systems. If schools are permitted to buy
individual copies and make unlimited multiple photocopies,
that entire market can be economically destroyed. Con-
sequently, in recent times, publishers have renewed their
efforts to confine the boundaries of the "fair use" exception
in the scholarly context.
The February 1972 Court of Claims case of The Williams and
Wilkins Co. v. United States vividly illustrates the problem.
That case was an attack on the dissemination practices of the
National Institute of Health and National Library of Medicine.
Page Twenty
These libraries typically subscribed to two copies of more than
3,000 medical journals. NIH on demand would photocopy any
article in any journal in its collection for any researcher
on its staff. NLM on request would photocopy any article in
its collection and supply it on a no-return basis to any
library or research-oriented institution participating in its
"inter-library loan" program.
The plaintiff, a publisher of medical Journals and books,
successfully attacked these practices as an infringement of
its copyrights. The court held that "fair use" did not
apply to these practices, for the following reasons:
"The photocopies are exact duplicates of the original
articles; are intended to be substitute for, and serve
the same purpose as, the original article; and serve
to diminish plaintiff's potential market for the original
articles since the photocopies are made at the request
of, and for the benefit of, the very persons who con-
13
stitutes plaintiff's market."
It seems clear that the same reasoning would invalidate
the multiple copying of a copyrighted work by a teacher for
distribution to her students. The copying would be a direct
substitute for the purchase by school authorities or the
students themselves of copies for each individual student.
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Because this is the main market of the educational publisher,
his market would be clearly diminished. This decision is
not final, but if it is sustained, its implications are
enormous.
A comprehensive educational communications system would
raise many other complex copyright problems. For example,
the manager of such a system would need to convert a vast
quantity of existing instructional material into suitable
form and store it in a centralized location, such as a com-
puter memory bank. Some of that material would be transmitted
and used extensively in the system; some of it might never
be used at all. At the outset, the extent of use for each
item might not be even roughly predictable. For maximum
utility, the materials should be readily and speedily avail-
able to the ultimate users for both evaluation and use. Each
user (primarily teachers) should be able to preview material,
edit it, display it as often and at whatever time suits his
convenience and educational needs. The material should be
reproducible in hard copy form for distribution to students
and subsequent reference.
Each of these steps can impinge upon the legal rights of
the copyright holder. Preparing the work for computer
insertion may involve its manual reproduction in punched cards,
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magnetic tapes or other machine readable form, or its
electronic insertion by means of an optical scanner. This
preparation may impinge upon several of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights.
First of all, it could be argued that the preparation is
a violation of the owner's exclusive right to "translate
the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or
make any other version thereof." There are no known cases
construing this language to include reproduction in machine
readable form. However, the courts have extended the trans-
lation right beyond conventional translation into foreign
languages.
Second, such reproduction might violate the owner's
exclusive right "to make . . . any transcription or record
thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any
manner or by any method be exhibited, delivered, presented,
produced, or be reproduced." The legislative history of this
section suggests Congress intended it to apply only to the
recording of a work that has been publicly performed for profit,
such as a musical show presentation. However, the language
of the section is much broader than that and, if applied
literally, would appear to cover the making of punched cards,
tapes and the like.
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Finally, machine form translation can be a violation of
the proprietor exclusive right to "copy". The definitive
case on the question of what is a "copy" is White-Smith v.
Apollo, 209 U.S. 1 (1908). That case held that the re-
production of a song on a perforated piano roll was not a
"copy" of the sheet music of the composition. The reasons
given by the court for its decision were two: First, the
roll was not a duplicate of the sheet music because it never
reproduced the written notes in any form. Second, the piano
roll was not visually perceivable to anyone but a person of
extraordinary patience and skill. Computer programs have this
second characteristic, in that they are not normally readable
by the naked eye. However, they differ from piano rolls in
the first characteristic--they can be used to reproduce the
original.
Much the same problems arise with respect to storing
the material in a computer and transmitting it to distant
locations. In each case, new electronic signals are produced
that are manifestations of the original work. Copyright
liability is a real possibility. So far as output is con-
cerned, the law seems to be a little clearer. Anytime a
work is reproduced in a tangible form, the work has been
"copied".
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Even if a hard copy is not made but the work is only
displayed on a screen or scope, the work may still be copied.
The key cases on this problem concern whether projecting a
copyrighted motion picture film onto a screen constitutes
"copying". The two courts that have considered the
question came to opposite conclusions: The U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland held projection was not
copying, Tiffany Production, Inc. v. Dewing 50 F.2d 911 (1931),
but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held it
was, Patterson v. Century Production, Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (1937).
Until the Supreme Court definitively rules on the question,
no one knows what the correct answer is.
V. Copyright Revision: Implications for Electronic Dissemination
Efforts have been underway for some time to replace the
1909 Copyright Act with a more modern statute. In 1955,
Congress directed the Copyright Office of the Library of
Congress to begin a comprehensive re-examination of the
copyright law with a view to its general revision. The
office prepared a number of studies that were published from
1955 through 1959. In 1961, the Register of Copyright issued
a report containing his conclusions and certain "tentative recom-
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mendations" for general law revision. He then convened a
series of meetings in which representatives of all interested
groups had an opportunity to thrash out the specific problems.
In 1963, a Preliminary Draft was prepared and circulated for
further discussion. A modified bill was introduced in 1964
in the 88th Congress for further dissemination and discussion.
In the 89th Congress, a revision bill was introduced that
managed only to receive approval from the House Judiciary
Committee in 1966. In the 90th Congress, another revision
bill was introduced and actually passed the House of Representa-
tives in 1967. However, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
refused to report the bill out, because of conflict over the
question of copyright liability for the community antenna
television industry. Bills were also introduced in the 91st
and 92nd Congress, but no action was taken in either session.
At this moment, copyright revision is probably a dead duck.
In spite of this lack of present activity on a copyright
bill, it is instructive to examine the pending legislation to
see how the problems described above would be affected by its
passage. For this purpose, discussion will be focused on S. 644
(92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1971), the most current bill available.
The general approach of the pending bill is to substantially
broaden the rights of the copyright owner, subject to specific
V
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exceptions in designated situations. Thus, the duration of
the copyright is extended by section 302 from the present maximum
term of 56 years to the life of the creator plus 50 years. For
that entire period, the copyright owner is given the following
exclusive rights by section 106:
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies of phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public . . .;
(4) . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) . . . to display the copyrighted work publicly."
There can be little doubt that most of the operations of
educational communication systems discussed above affect these
rights. Classroom teacher duplication for class distribution
is "reproducing the copyrighted work in copies." In fact,
if the teacher sws it to the class on a screen by slide or
overhead projector, she is "displaying it publicly", another
of the protected exclusive rights. So far as information
storage and retrieval are concerned, it seems clear that
transferring information from printed into machine read-
able form is either "copying" or preparation of a "derivative
work" and hence an infringement. Many of the manipulations and
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analyses that a computer can do could also be considered "deriva-
tive works." And clearly any form of output--print-out, visual
or by voice--of copyrighted material is an infringement. The
distribution of the work by a communications system is also a
"performance or display" of the work and thus within the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner. Finally, the ultimate use of the
material transmitted, whether it be displayed, copied, edited,
projected, or restored, is another infringement.
Thus, if copyrighted material can be utilized in any way
in an educational communication system without the prior
consent of the copyright owner it can be only by virtue of one
or more of the specific exceptions contained in other sections
of the proposed bill. These exceptions will now be examined.
Section 107 of the bill specifically permits the "fair use"
of a copyrighted work, for purposes such as teaching or research.
However, the bill does not draw any line between "fair use" and
copyright infringement. Instead, it merely directs consideration
of the following factors:
"(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work."
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In other words, the drafters of the bill have abandoned any
effort to produce a precise guide to the limits of permissible
fair use. Instead, users are forced to rely on "fair use" at
their peril, with possible infringement liability and the
risk of expensive, time-consuming litigation.
In addition, the bill contains a number of specific
exceptions for educational users. First, section 110 provides that
a copyrighted work can be performed or displayed in a classroom
"in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a non-
profit educational institution." This exception would apparently
not apply to copying of a work, only to its performance or display.
Moreover, it would seem to require that the teacher be present
in the room every time a student views the work.
Second, section U of the bill permits the performance or
display of a copyrighted work by means of an educational system.
However, to come within the protection of this particular exception,
three criteria must all be met. First, the performance or display
must be "a regular part of the systematic instructional
activities" of a school. Second, the performance or display
must be "directly related and of material assistance to the
teaching content of the transmission". Third, the transmission
must be primarily for reception in classrooms or for people
with disabilities that prevent their attendance in classrooms.
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Finally, educational broadcasters are permitted to make
no more than twelve copies of any transmitted work. However,
these copies cannot be recopied. Further, all but one of
them must be destroyed within five years after the program
was first transmitted to the public.
These are the extent of the educational exception to
the broad rights granted to copyright owners. It seems
clear that none of them will provide comprehensive protection
for an educational communication system.
Therefore such a system cannot utilize copyrighted
materials without the consent of the copyright owner. This
will put three serious limitations on the operation of such
a system. First, the owner will customarily extract a fee
for his consent, thereby increasing the costs of the edu-
cational system. Second, finding the owner of the rights
(which are freely transferrable) can involve great expense
and time, which means high transaction costs. Finally,
nothing requires the copyright owner to give his consent at any
price. In such a case, public dissemination and education
can be seriously hampered.
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Conclusion
No designer or operator of an educational communications
system can hope to develop a viable system without a comprehensive
working knowledge and appreciation for the legal restraints on
the dissemination of instructional materials.
The laws relating to public school systems will have a
significant influence in his selection of materials. He must
decide whether to emphasize subjects that are mandated almost
universally or those that are offered only at the discretion of
local school boards. He must also decide whether to offer com-
prehensive basic "electronic textbooks" or supplementary
materials only. Decisions on both these questions will depend
upon whether he is more concerned about minimizing his political
difficulties or reaching the largest possible market. This paper
recommends astrategy of utilizing the system at first primarily
for peripheral tasks and deferring its broader utilization
until acceptability is assured.
The copyright laws will present serious difficulties if he
wishes to disseminate materials copyrighted by others. Under
existing law, it is almost impossible for him to do so without ob-
taining the prior consent of the copyright owner (invariably the
publisher) on whatever terms and conditions the owner impose. More-
over, the proposed copyright revision now pending before Congress
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offer the communication system operator little encouragement for
the future. If anything, the revision expands the right of the
copyright owner with specific exemptions that are unattractive
to a technologically modern communications system.
Further study should examine other alternatives to the
present and proposed copyright laws. A number of more
attractive alternatives have been proposed and preliminarily
studied, such as compulsory licensing requirements, creation of
a centralized educational licensing authority and the like.
These other alternatives should be analyzed and evaluated from
the viewpoint of the educational communication system creators.
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